Hahnemann and Kant: Contemporary Masterminds?

“Correctly understood Hahnemann could be called the “Kant of Medicine.” Both are corresponding figures in their own fields.” (1)

Reprinted with the permission of Similia: Journal of the Australian Homoeopathic Association, Volume 34, issue # 2.

In several previous studies (2, 3, 4) it was concluded that Hahnemann started out very much as an empiricist but later adopted much more metaphysical views. (4) This article looks at the possible influence of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) on his ideas.

The Context

With the birth of science in the 1500s, initiated by figures like Bacon, Hobbes and Copernicus, centuries of metaphysical and spiritual views seemed suddenly swept aside or were at least exposed to radical reappraisal. This new scientific movement stood opposed to abstract ideas and traditional dogmas (so-called metaphysics) and instead stressed empirical observation of the physical world and the conduction of experiments as the preferred methods for finding the truth about substance, motion, the self and God, life, the world, and everything. (5)

Mostly during the 17^th century, a host of key figures—Galileo, Boyle, Newton, Locke, Harvey, Vesalius, Hooke and von Leeuwenhoek—then pushed through an accelerating programme of experimental investigations that generated much new knowledge about human life and the world, often called the scientific revolution or enlightenment.

In due course, empirical science gained enormous recognition and authority and thus by about 1600 it had become a serious threat to all other sources of knowledge and especially to the ideas of the Church and of Aristotle, which had held unquestioned prestige and authority for many centuries.

“But the most important reason for Aristotle’s dominance in the areas of logic, science, and natural philosophy over a period of 2,000 years is the sheer range of topics he covered.” (6) It was therefore somewhat inevitable that reactions against materialist science from metaphysical thinkers would duly appear.

Examples include the works of Spinoza, Berkeley, Malebranche and Leibniz, all of whom basically rejected the Newtonian idea of matter in motion and asserted the superiority of metaphysical speculation and religious ideas over those of scientific empiricism. (7)

Such a backlash had seemed inevitable once Newton’s mechanical notions about matter and forces had gained such widespread recognition, explanatory power, credence and authority by about 1700. The French soon began to think that the same ideas could also be applied to society and politics. (8)

However, the notion that human beings are little more than ‘matter in motion’ like the rest of the Newtonian universe, was probably a step too far. The reactions against such a view comprised a reassertion of the value of spirituality and metaphysics and a rejection of the ‘soulless’ tenets of Newtonian science. In the resulting turmoil a series of ideas were set in motion and the need for some form of compromise between conflicting viewpoints became apparent. Two movements were then spawned: Kant’s critical or transcendental philosophy (9) and the Romanticism of Goethe and Schelling. (10)

Kant’s Ideas

Kant’s main aim was to try and bridge the gulf between the empirical world of scientists like Newton and the metaphysical beliefs of religious and rationalist thinkers like Leibniz. (11) He sought, and claimed to have found, a means to reconcile these two opposing views of human nature and the world. His main work, The Critique of Pure Reason, represents “his attempt to reconcile the world of Newtonian physics, the world of empirical reality governed by causal laws which exclude freedom, with the world of the moral consciousness, the world of freedom,” (12) and reach “a compromise between Continental rationalism and British empiricism,” (13) which is an “attempt to reconcile reason and nature.” (14)

“Kant tries to reconcile the apparently incompatible dimensions of observed empirical data and a priori knowledge,” (15) “Kant’s original aim…was to reconcile the claims of metaphysics and natural science, he did so by degrading the objects of science to the status of appearances, while assigning metaphysics to the domain of reality.” (16) He wished to balance “the legitimate claims of both the Newtonians and the Leibnizians. In this Kant succeeds quite deftly. The distinction between appearance and reality allows him to make a place for science and metaphysics, without denying to either the title of knowledge.” (17)

According to the empiricists like Locke and Hume, all our knowledge comes from sensory experience. Although Kant was partly willing to acknowledge this, he also saw that there are some aspects of our knowledge that are internal and cannot be convincingly derived from sensory experience.

Therefore, he conceded that some aspects of our knowledge are ‘a priori,’ i.e., are innate and not accountable solely through sensory experience. This point is highly relevant to philosophy and Kant therefore tried to form a synthesis between the empirical truths of sense experience and the ideas of the rationalists like Leibniz, Spinoza and Berkeley, in the hope of forming a “sophisticated synthesis of rationalism tempered by empiricism.” (18)

By minimising what we regard as reality—the outer visible world—into mere ‘appearances,’ Kant was able to refer to the world ‘as it is’—i.e., the ultimate unknowable world—as a ‘noumenous’ realm that lies inaccessible, beyond the world of sensory experience.

The material world, “is, in Kant’s view, conditioned by an underlying realm of noumenal existence.” (19) “As thought is wider than sense, and reveals to us the existence of a noumenal realm, we are enabled to reconcile belief in the freedom of the will with the mechanism of nature;” (20) “the universe of science is wholly a universe of phenomena, and behind phenomena…there must be the noumena, the ultimate causes of all things.” (21) Kant postulated “a noumenal world of causes as the background of the phenomenal world of effects.” (22)

In creating this distinction between a phenomenal external visible world and an imperceptible realm lying behind it, he was able to bring the ideas of Newtonian mechanics and sense experience—i.e., empirical reality—into a common ground with the abstract concepts of metaphysical thinkers. This in short is the Kantian compromise or ‘Copernican revolution’ that Kant felt he had bestowed upon philosophy. (23)

To some extent, his thesis reflects the fact that we cannot know the world in its ultimate essence because we each receive our perception of things through a ‘filter’ of our own preconceptions, interests, past experiences and prejudices.

“In Kant’s epistemology the entire world of experience was actually a product of the human mind, which, acting like a filter, screened and ordered the sensations according to its own structure.” (24) “in the Kantian sense, phenomenal; the way in which things as they really are appear to minds endowed with a certain conceptual framework.” (25)

Therefore, it is inevitable that none of us can see the world ‘as it really is.’ We each perceive only partial and distorted versions of it. But Kant goes even further than this and attempts to show that there are fundamental and innate aspects of our consciousness that predetermine how we see and apprehend things.

After being tutored in Leibnizian metaphysics, Kant then became a great supporter of Newtonian mechanics, only later returning to see that a synthesis of both was needed, whereupon he placed metaphysics as the underpinning foundation for his critical philosophy and in effect downgraded the external tangible and visible world to a state of mere appearance.

To some, Kant appears to have closed the door on metaphysics, but others seem to find in his writings that door still left partly open. However, if we look at the social and cultural context in Germany at that time a more complex picture emerges that partly explains his apparent ambivalence.

Eighteenth Century Germany

There is no doubt that in the first half of the 18th century, Germany was awash with metaphysics, especially the ideas of Leibniz. And yet the rampant materialism of Newtonian mechanics was sweeping over France, England and the rest of northern Europe.

The Germans loathed and detested Newton and the nihilistic materialism and mechanism that he represented. For the Romantics the most detested “villains of the whole modern period, were Locke and Newton…who killed the spirit by cutting reality into some kind of mathematically symmetrical pieces.” (26) They refused to believe in a ‘clockwork universe’ or that human life is little more than matter in motion.

And they also had good reason to hate the French in general—both politically and culturally. “The whole thing was of course an immense protest against the French.” (27); “Napoleon’s victories had aroused only nationalist resentment in most Germans. Democracy came to be a term of abuse, associated with the hated French, while the German sense of identity became centred on the Prussian military…liberal and radical aspirations were ruthlessly suppressed, contributing to a socially alienated Romantic turn towards nature, the inner life, and the medieval heritage.” (28) “The French were hated in 1757, as indeed they had been the previous century.” (29)

Therefore, a veritable timebomb of ‘metaphysical indignation’ was brewing in Germany, which then exploded with the publications of Goethe, Novalis and Schelling and the Romantic enterprise that lingered on into the 1830s.

The Romantic “abhorrence of scientific expertise inspired radical protest in the works of William Blake, of the young Schiller, and of populist writers in eastern Europe. Above all, it contributed to literary turbulence in Germany in the second third of the eighteenth century.” (30)

As with Kant, the Romantic movement revolved very much around the issue of freedom of the will. Somewhat astonishingly, however, all these events can be traced back almost entirely to a comprehensive rejection of Newtonian physics. What the Romantics “attacked with equal violence was the entire tidy ordering of life by the principles of reason and scientific knowledge advocated by the progressive thinkers of France, England and Italy.” (31)

In essence, three different types of people and beliefs felt threatened by Newtonian mechanics. Firstly, those religious people who saw God as the Lord of the world, an immaterial being that comes before and stands above material reality.

Secondly, the creative artists and imaginative writers, musicians, poets and people who believed that the realms of the mind, heart and life stand above material reality. And thus, in creativity and the imagination they see a form of spiritual freedom and power that Newtonianism dismissed as an illusion. And thirdly, there were the philosophers who regarded reason, logic, thinking and the mental realm in general as lying above the material world.

All three sets of people saw Newton’s ideas—and those of Locke and Bacon—as a threat to their own views. They saw this rampant materialistic philosophy as philistine, nihilistic and deterministic, that disallowed human freedom and creativity and subordinated the realm of the mind, heart and spirit to the mechanical activities of matter.

Nihilistic because matter is always in a state of flux and it has no inherent permanence and thus, according to materialism, the only real prospect that we face in our short lives, is death. And so, the reaction against Newtonianism by the Romantics involved a motley crew of artists, philosophers and some religious types who were all united by their rejection of Newtonian materialism.

Romanticism was a “late eighteenth-century reaction against the mechanistic conception of nature and its growing preference for an organic model to describe the world.” (32) It was “Newtonian science that the Romantics reacted against…the banishing of the divine from nature had emptied the world of its mystery. It was this demystification of nature that they resented,” (32) and which “thus provided an encouragement for materialism and atheism.” (32) “The Romantics therefore can be seen to respond to the challenging intellectual debates that had begun with the Enlightenment project and to respond to its implications in matters of science, philosophy and religion.” (32) “The writers and thinkers of the Enlightenment imagined themselves as emerging from centuries of darkness and ignorance into a new age enlightened by reason, science and a respect for humanity.” (32)

The Romantic artists and philosophers rejected Newtonian materialism: “What Newton effectively did was, like Locke, to banish God (or the first cause) from the realm of the physical world, which became solely the arena of physical forces (or second causes)…(like) a great machine.” (32) “It was Voltaire’s popularization of Newton’s work…which introduced his ideas to a wider audience and established them as the cornerstone of Enlightenment science.” (32)

The enlightenment “did have its atheistic and materialistic wing, including such figures as Diderot, Baron d’Holbach, Maupertuis…(who) proposed a materialist and deterministic account of nature and of the mind and they regarded religion as the response of primitive societies to the forms of a nature whose workings they could not comprehend.” (32) but many still “held a high view of the Bible as a repository of deep spiritual and artistic truths.” (32)

 Kant’s Response

Now, Kant (1724-1804) was a philosopher who had grown up through all of this. And he wanted to reconcile German metaphysics with Newtonian mechanics. He studied the Leibniz-Newton correspondence, for example, which had degenerated into a nationalistic argument between Germany and England. And from his studies of Newton, Locke and Hume, he experienced a dramatic shift in his thinking in favour of empiricism.

But he had to leave that door to metaphysics partly open for the sake of his compatriots, at the very least for the sake of their intellectual dignity. “Kant views dignity as the most fundamental and prominent value.” (33) In Germany, the Kantian idea of human dignity is “the fundamental principle of the entire legal system,” (34) and “according to Kant, humanity or rational nature has dignity.” (35)

Kant also had to retain a foothold in metaphysics due to his urge to maintain the notion of free will in his moral philosophy. This notion of free will was an important consideration for all the German Idealist philosophers. Strict adherence to the empirical determinism of nature disallows the freedom of the will, and so we find Kant “freeing himself from the shackles of empiricism.” (36)

The idea of free will “allows him to assign a positive status to those concepts, such as the Ideas of God, freedom, and immortality, which do not meet the conditions for empirical employment, but yet have a role to play in moral philosophy or religion.” (37) This includes “the (causal) freedom of the will, the immutability of the (substantial) soul, and the existence of God,” (38) i.e., those “unknowable possibles, namely God, freedom, and immortality.” (39) “He is interested in the fate of metaphysics itself – cognition of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul.” (40)

Retaining this aspect of metaphysics enabled Kant to avoid free will from being subsumed by a form of mechanical determinism of the pure Newtonian kind: “the problem of free will and moral choice does not feature in Newton’s view of space.” (41)

Kant therefore attempted a “reconciliation of freedom and determinism,” (42) “he proposes to solve the conflict of determinism and freedom by transcendental idealism;” (43) “freedom can be created only by reducing nature to a realm of mere appearances and positing an underlying reality where intentions can be freely formed independently of the causal determinism of nature.” (44)

Kant was such an exemplar of his era, and yet German medicine did not immediately follow him and become more empirical but chose instead to follow Schelling and Goethe into the dark abyss of unbridled metaphysical speculation: a point so strongly lamented by Hahnemann. (45) Perhaps Kant, far from being ignored, was influential, not as a dyed in the wool empiricist, but as someone who left the door to metaphysics at least partly ajar if not open even wider.

Hahnemann

Kant’s point is highly relevant to Hahnemann, when you consider that not all of homoeopathy derives from empirical observation and experiments—what he called experience. His medical views were mostly “based only on accurate observation of nature, on careful experimentation and pure experience,” (46) and what “multiplied experience and careful observation have led me to adopt,” (47) but some of it is abstract, theoretical and conceptual (e.g., vital force and miasms) and thus innately of a metaphysical nature.

At some point in his journey, while still regarding pure experience as crucially important, Hahnemann became increasingly concerned with metaphysical notions that seem to lie behind homoeopathic processes, in terms of how the remedies are made, how they act in the body and where sickness comes from within the organism.

Rejecting the materialist, chemical and physiological ideas of mainstream medicine, Hahnemann outlined his own epistemology of organism functioning as follows: “the diseases of man are not caused by any substance, any acridity, that is to say, any disease-matter, but that they are solely spirit-like (dynamic) derangements of the spirit-like power (the vital force) that animates the human body.” (48)

The internal causes of sickness “are merely spirit-like (conceptual) dynamic derangements of the life.” (49) It is this “inward change which caused the symptoms.” (50) “It is only the pathologically untuned vital force that causes diseases;” (51) “all diseases are only dynamic disturbances of the vital principle and are not caused by anything material;” (52) “this spirit-like power to alter man’s state of health…lies hidden in the inner nature of medicines.” (53)

In other words, while Hahnemann was content in the early days to concern himself solely with the processes and experiences of homoeopathy—its original empirical grounding—but later he chose to explore more fully the underlying reasons, as he saw them, for the observations he had made.

Locating the point in time when Hahnemann made this shift in his thinking is difficult to pinpoint precisely, but it appears to have been some time in the 1815-20 period, possibly between Organon 2 (1819) and Organon 3 (1824). This time location can only be vaguely inferred from the terms he uses in his writings, such as lebenskraft (vital force) and lebensprincip (vital principle). (54)

The analogy between Hahnemann and Kant is also especially strong when you consider that Hahnemann says the nature of sickness is imperceptible and lies beyond the realm of visible symptoms, that it lies beyond the empirical realm of appearances. “The invisible disease-producing change in the inward man and the complex of outwardly perceptible symptoms.” (55)

He therefore took a similar step to Kant by proposing that the causes of sickness being invisible and incomprehensible, lie entirely beyond the realm of the physical body and its symptoms. They are only detectable via the symptoms expressed and made manifest.

It is thus an invisible realm of causation that is known only through it impinging upon the realm of appearances by manifesting symptoms. He condemned all materialist speculation about the nature and causes of illness because he saw them as unknowable and thus all attempts to understand the invisible causes of sickness are futile.

Not being averse to speculation himself, (56) nevertheless, Hahnemann rejected all “those speculative broodings over the essential nature of the medicinal powers of drugs, over vitality, over the inner invisible working of the organism in health and over the changes of this hidden inner working which constitute disease—in other words, over the inner nature and essence of illness.” (57) and thereby he acknowledged “the futility of all metaphysical speculations that are not confirmed by experience;” (58) “to weave so-called systems from fancy ideas and hypotheses about the inner nature of the vital processes and the origin of diseases in the invisible interior of the organism.” (59) “The wiseacres define diseases a priori and attributed to them transcendental substrata not warranted by experience…they pretended to possess an insight into the inner nature of things and invisible vital processes, which no mortal can have.” (60) He says the cause of sickness lies beyond mortal understanding.

“Little was we mortals know of the operations that take place in the interior economy in health which must be hidden from us.” (61) We can never reach it or describe it in explanatory terms. Like Kant, he embraces both the realm of empirical experience (appearances, phenomena) and that of abstract conceptuality (reality, noumena) placing them both into a unified vision of the organism in health and sickness. That seems to be a very Kantian turn on Hahnemann’s part.

Hahnemann also states that sickness does not arise from any external factors, but stems from causes internal to the organism, and more specifically from derangements in the innate vital or self-healing powers. (62) He further states that these derangements are non-physical, immaterial and thus of a spirit-like nature. (63)

In some ways it would seem that Hahnemann meandered along a path similar to that of Kant, espousing a materialist and empirical position some of the time, and yet expressing some metaphysical notions towards the end. It is hard to know whether he had harboured these metaphysical inclinations all along, or if it was solely experience that had led him in that direction.

Later on, of course, he invoked the chronic miasms as the root causes of all illness, while at the same time still insisting that the essential nature of health derangements remains entirely beyond mortal sight and comprehension.

 Conclusions

Although Hahnemann had always—and quite rightly—stressed the empirical and experimental origins of homoeopathy and he had repeatedly condemned the speculative metaphysics of the Romantic thinkers, yet suddenly he felt compelled to outline certain forms of speculative metaphysics within homoeopathy.

That is quite a dramatic shift. The most likely explanation for this change of heart on Hahnemann’s part, is the enormous importance and continued influence within German culture of Kant’s ideas which “were beginning to achieve a wide circulation after 1790.” (64) Perhaps he could see in Kant a man who had wrestled with similar problems to himself?

As we said at the outset, Kant’s big idea was to try and reach some kind of compromise between metaphysics and empirical science. “The distinction between appearance and reality allows him to make a place for science and metaphysics, without denying to either the title of knowledge.” (65)

The most obvious significance of Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ is that it showed that empirical science should not be surrendered to as some kind of ideological tyranny—the only Organon or instrument of truth—but that metaphysics also has an important role to play in our understanding of the world.

This means that the physical and the mental realms can both contribute towards an equal partnership in our understanding of things. Hahnemann also tries to place empiricism and metaphysics together.

It seems unlikely that Hahnemann would have come to such a similar conclusion himself quite independently, but he could have reached such a view after reading Kant or reading what others had said about Kant’s ideas. Either way, he seems to have arrived at a similar position, because after about 1818-19 (66) he started to allow himself for the first time to speak openly about homoeopathy in other than exclusively empirical terms.

It seems more than a coincidence that this drift in his writings towards metaphysics appears at a time when Kant’s ideas were still a very dominant force in German intellectual life. In some respects, at least, it seems fair to say that Hahnemann “considered himself to be Kantian,” (67) and he “was Kantian in his belief in an epistemology based on empirical observations, yet post-Kantian in his insistence on the actuality of Lebenskraft.” (68)

Acknowledgement

I am very grateful to Professor Robert Paul Wolff of Amherst College, for some help regarding Kant. His ten YouTube lectures on Kant (69) are outstanding for their clarity, and via email he was able to kindly clarify certain points about the role of metaphysics and free will in Kant’s moral philosophy.

References

1. Rudolf Tischner, The History of Homoeopathy, New York: American Institute of Homeopathy, 1933, p.317
2. P Morrell, Influences on Hahnemann, The American Homeopath 26, Spring 2021, pp.87-95
3. P Morrell, Homoeopathy and Romanticism, New Homeopath, UK, 40.1, Spring 2021, pp.31-35
4. P Morrell, Was Hahnemann an Empiricist? Similia, 34.1, June 2021, pp.47-52
5. See Evan Schofer, The Expansion of Science as Social Authority and Institutional Structure in the World System, 1700-1900, Stanford University Press, 1999
6. E Grant, God and Reason in the Middle Ages, CUP, 2001, p.89
7. See F Burwick, The Damnation of Newton: Goethe’s Colour Theory and Romantic Perception, Netherlands: De Gruyter, 2012; Val Dusek, The Holistic Inspirations of Physics: The Underground History of Electromagnetic Theory, Rutgers University Press, 1999
8. See for example: John W. Gunn, Diderot and the French Encyclopedists, Haldeman-Julius Company, 1924; Frank A. Kafker, The Encyclopedists and the French Revolution, Columbia University, 1961; J. H. Brumfitt, French Enlightenment: Philosophers in Perspective, Macmillan Education, 1972
9. I Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 2nd edition, 1785
10. R Tischner, Hahnemann und Schelling, Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften, (H. 1/2), 1937, pp.98-112; Gunther Lange, Die homeopathie als Kind der Romantik (Homoeopathy as the Child of Romanticism), MD thesis, University of Kiel, 1947; Rudolf Tischner, Hahnemann und die Romantik, Allgemeine Homöopathische Zeitung 201.09 (1956): 313-318; Heinz Henne, Hahnemann und der Schellingsche Naturphilosophie, 28th International Congress on Homeopathic Medicine, Vienna, 1973, pp.203-214; Alice Kuzniar, The Birth of Homeopathy Out of the Spirit of Romanticism, Univ. Toronto Press, 2017; G Rosen, Romantic Medicine: a problem in historical periodization, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Vol. 25, No. 2 (March-April, 1951), pp.149-158
11. G. W. Leibniz, Samuel Clarke & Roger Ariew (Ed.) Correspondence, 1713
12. F J Coplestone, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 6: Modern Philosophy: From the French Enlightenment to Kant, New York: H Doubleday, 1994, p.347
13. R P Wolff, Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963, p.21
14. J.T.W. Ryall, A Copernican Critique of Kantian Idealism, McMillan, 2017, p.196
15. A Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy from Kant to Habermas, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, p.17
16. Wolff, op. cit., p.165
17. Wolff, p.21
18. Paul Guyer, Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness, CUP, 2000, p.18
19. N Kemp Smith, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p.li
20. ibid., p.20
21. Evans Wentz, The Fairy Faith in Celtic Countries, OUP, 1911, p.416
22. ibid., p.443. See also, for example, P Schiappa, Phenomena & Noumena, Westbrow Press, 2018
23. I Kant & N Kemp Smith (trans.), Critique of Pure Reason, 1929, p.22; J Everet Green, Kant’s Copernican Revolution: the Transcendental Horizon, Maryland: University Press of America, 1997, p.8
24. G B Risse, Kant, Schelling, and the Early Search for a Philosophical ‘Science’ of Medicine in Germany, Journal of the History of Medicine, April 1972, pp.145-158, quote, p.147
25. W Sellars and J F Sicha, Kant’s Transcendental Metaphysics, Ridgeway Publ, 2002, p.323
26. I Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, Princeton University Press, 1999, p.49
27. ibid.
28. C Hourihane, The Grove Encyclopaedia of Medieval Art & Architecture, OUP, 2012, vol 2, p.662
29. P Wilson, German Armies War and German Society, 1648-1806, Taylor & Francis, 2002, p.274; see also, Peter Schulman, Aminia M. Brueggemann, Rhine Crossings: France and Germany in Love and War, SUNY, 2006
30. I Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind, London: Pimlico, 1998, p.257
31. ibid., p.257
32. All quotes are from Duncan Wu, A Companion to Romanticism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, pages 39-50
33. Sherzad Ahmed AL-Najjar, Hemn Ghani Saeed, Immanuel Kant’s concept of dignity: A philosophical ground and a case for considering human dignity as the highest constitutional value, Politics Q, No. 65, 2020, pp.525-547, quote: p.529
34. S Palmquist, Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy, Holland: De Gruyter, 2010, p.18
35. Palmquist, p.248. See also: Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, Paper to University of California, Berkeley, April 21–23, 2009, 47pp, Yasushi Kato, ‎Gerhard Schönrich, Kant’s Concept of Dignity, Ebook, 2019 and Oliver Sensen, Kant on Human Dignity, Holland: De Gruyter, 2011
36. Beryl Logan (ed.), Immanuel Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics in Focus, Routledge, 1996, p.179
37. Wolff, op. cit., p.91
38. ibid., p.215
39. ibid., p.294
40. James R. O’Shea, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason a Critical Guide, CUP, 2017, p.20
41. O’Shea, p.70
42. Guyer, op. cit., p.397
43. Guyer, p.394
44. Guyer, p.393
45. See, for example, G B Risse, Brunonian therapeutics: new wine in old bottles? Medical History, 32(S8), 1988, pp.46-62; R Kondratas, The Brunonian influence on the Medical Thought and Practice of Joseph Frank, Medical History, 32(S8), 1988, pp.75-88; T Broman, The Transformation of German Academic Medicine, 1750–1820, CUP, 1996; S Hahnemann, Fragmentary Observations on Brown’s Elements of Medicine, 1801, in S Hahnemann & R E Dudgeon, The Lesser Writings of Samuel Hahnemann, New York: William Radde, 1852, pp.405-416
46. Organon, §.52
47. Organon, §.270
48. Boericke/Dudgeon, 5^th/6^th Organon, Preface
49. Organon, footnote to §.31
50. Organon 1, §.13
51. Kunzli, Organon 6, §.12
52. Kunzli, Organon 6, §.282
53. Organon, §.20
54. Several key terms he uses in the Organon editions increase steadily in frequency from the 2nd (1819) or 3rd (1824) edition onwards. Examples include: lebenskraft (vital force), lebensprincip (vital principle) & miasms.
55. Organon 1, §.12
56. For example, his highly speculative Coffee theory of 1803; On the Effects of Coffee, from original Observations (1803) in The Lesser Writings of Samuel Hahnemann, 1852, pp.391-409
57. Hahnemann & Wheeler, Organon 1, footnote to §.13
58. Devrient, Organon 4, §.8
59. Kunzli & Naude, Organon 6, §.1
60. Dudgeon, Organon 5, Preface to Organon 2
61. Dudgeon, Organon 5, 1893, Introduction, p.29
62. see note 60
63. see note 61
64. Risse, op. cit., p.147
65. Wolff, op. cit., p.21
66. For example, Lebenskraft (vital force) first appears in aphorisms 53 and 54 of the second edition of the Organon (1819)
67. Kuzniar, op cit., p.127
68. Kuzniar, p.20
69. For example, lecture 1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d__In2PQS60